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of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
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& TRUST COMPANY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 8979 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal by plaintiffs and appellants from a 
judgment of the District Court of Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr., Judge, presiding, con-
struing the will of Frederick S. Auerbach, deceased. 
Under the provisions of the aforesaid will, the residue 
of the estate was placed in trust with the income therefrom 
to be paid to decedent's wife for life, then to decedent's 
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son for life and upon the son's death, the principal to be 
paid to the then living issue of the son, and, in default of 
issue, to decedent's living sisters. In question here is 
whether under the terms of the will the trust may be 
partially terminated during the lifetime of the wife and 
one third of the principal paid to the son if he is 30 years 
of age and an additional one third if he has arrived at 
45 years of age or, in the trustee's discretion, two thirds' 
of the principal paid to the son irrespective of age. 
Plaintiffs and appellants are the living sisters of deced-
ent. Defendants and respondents are the duly appointed 
and acting trustees of the trust. 
On cross motions for summary judgment, the court 
below ruled that in the event of the voluntary release or 
renunciation of the wife's life interest in the income of 
the trust, the trust would thereupon partially terminate 
in the same way and to the same effect as if the wife had 
died at the moment of the termination of her life interest 
in the trust. The trustees under the Court's ruling would 
then have the duties and discretions to make payments or 
distributions of income and principal from the trust to 
the son in such amounts as would have been payable or 
distributable to him in the event of his Mother's death. 
Plaintiffs and appellants appeal fron1 this part of the 
Court's ruling upon the gTound that the trust being an 
art in-, continuing trust "·ith purposes of the testator still 
to he accotnplished, cannot be either totally or partially 
terminated prior to the specific titne of termination pre-
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scribed in the trust instrument, either with or without the 
consent of all of the beneficiaries under the trust, in-
cluding unborn issue of the son as well as plaintiffs and 
appellants who are contingent beneficiaries under the 
trust. 
No appeal is taken by plaintiffs and appellants from 
paragraph 7 of the judgment below holding that the 
term "issue," as used in the will, refers to natural de-
scendants and does not include adopted children. The 
facts are taken from the pleadings. 
Frederick S. Auerbach died testate on May 28, 1938, 
at Salt Lake City, Utah, and his last will and testament 
was duly admitted to probate in the Probate Court of 
Salt Lake County on June 15, 1938. The decedent nom-
inated and appointed his wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach 
(who has subsequently married the defendant L. F. 
Samuels) as executrix and trustee under the will. At the 
time of h~s death, decedent was about 48 years of age and 
left surviving him his wife, Fannie, and one son, Fred-
erick Fox Auerbach, then about 11 years of age. The 
will had been executed in Hartford, Connecticut, on 
February 15, 1936, when the decedent was 46 years of 
age. 
The residue of the estate in accordance with the will 
was transferred by decedent's wife, Fannie, as executrix, 
to the trust on or about July 3, 1946. Under the provisions 
of the will, thy wife was initially appointed and qualified 
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as a trustee. L. F. Samuels was appointed a co-trustee 
on July 3, 1946, Walker Bank & Trust Company a co-
trustee on July 12, 1948, and the son, Frederick Fox 
Auerbach, a co-trustee on July 2, 1948, upon his arrival 
at the age of 21 years. The son became 30 years of age 
in June, 1957, and has no issue presently born. 
In June, 195 7, defendant, L. R. Samuels, negotiated 
with plaintiffs for the purchase of 2,283 shares of common 
stock of the Auerbach Company owned by plaintiffs, 
said number of shares comprising approximately a one 
third interest in said company. Among the assets of the 
Frederick S. Auerbach trust is a similar one third interest 
in the company, the remaining one third interest being 
owned by Beatrice Fox Auerbach of Hartford, Connect-
icut, and her children. Beatrice and Fannie are sisters 
who married Auerbach brothers, George and Frederick. 
George had predeceased Frederick by several years. A 
third brother, Herbert, never married and died in 1945. 
After prices and terms had been agreed upon during 
the aforesaid negotiations, plaintiffs were informed and 
thereby discovered that the defendant trustees intended to 
secure a release from the widow, Fannie, of her life in-
terest in the trust and thereupon convey, pursuant to an 
assignment to be secured from the son, Frederick Fox 
Auerbach, a two-thirds interest in the properties of the 
trust to four new trusts to be known as the First, Second, 
Third and Fourth Frederick F. Auerbach trusts. These 
trusts were to be created for the purpose of acquiring 
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trust containing a divided one fourth of the one third of 
Auerbach stock to be acquired from plaintiffs and the one 
third of Auerbach stock to be transferred from the Fred-
erick S. Auerbach trust. For the purpose of raising the 
money to pay plaintiffs, the four new trusts planned to 
borrow the money from Walker Bank & Trust Company 
upon the security of the assets of the four new trusts. Trus-
tees of the four new trusts were to be Frederick Fox Auer-
bach, Fannie F. A. Samuels, L. R. Samuels, Walker Bank 
& Trust Company and in each case a daughter or a son-
in-law of Beatrice Fox Auerbach. These trusts created a 
life estate for the son, Frederick Fox Auerbach, and his 
wife and at the conclusion of the trusts1 the principal was 
to be distributed to his natural children and, in default 
of such issue, to the grandchildren or descendants of 
Beatrice Fox Auerbach. 
When plaintiffs and appellants learned of the proposed 
plan of decedent's widow to release her life estate and, 
in concert with her son and the other trustees, to effect 
a partial termination of the trust to the extent of two-
thirds of the principal thereof, all further negotiations for 
the sale of the stock were terminated. 
The present suit was filed by plaintiffs on or about 
August 29, 1957 asking that the four defendant trustees 
comply with the terms of the will and be enjoined from 
unlawfully invading and distributing any part of the 
principal of the trust to decedent's son, Frederick Fox 
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Auerbach, during the lifetime of his Mother. Plaintiffs 
asked the Court to construe the will and determine: 
"A. What would be the legal effect of a release 
by the widow, Fannie F. A. Samuels, of her right 
to receive the income from said trust fund during 
her natural life? 
Would such release effectively terminate her 
right to receive the income of said trust during her 
natural life? 
Would such release accelerate the right of Fred-
erick Fox Auerbach to receive the income from 
said trust during his natural life? 
Would such release accelerate the right of Fred-
reick Fox Auerbach to receive any part of the 
principal' of the trust? 
Would such release empower the trustees to 
anticipate and invade the principal of the trust 
prior to the death of said Fannie F. A. Samuels, 
and to pay any part of the principal of said trust 
to the son, Frederick. Fox Auerbach; and, if so, at 
what age or ages and in what amount or 
amounts?" 
A construction of the word "issue" and whether it would 
include adopted children, was likewise requested. Plain-
tiffs also prayed for attorneys' fees and costs and dis-
bursements of suit. 
The pertinent provisions of the will of Frederick S. 
Auerbach, deceased, are contained in paragraphs Fourth 
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and Sixth and read as follows: 
"FOURTH: I give, devise and bequeath all of 
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate, of 
every nature and kind, wheresoever the same may 
be situated, to my Trustees hereinafter named in 
trust however, the income therefrom to be paid to 
my beloved wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach, for and 
during the term of her natural life, and upon her 
death, or in case my said wife shall die before I 
die, to my son, Frederick Fox Auerbach, for and 
during the term of his natural life, excepting that 
if my said son Frederick Fox Auerbach, at the time 
of the death of my said wife, or at the time of my 
death should my said wife predecease me, shall 
have reached the age of forty-five years, my trust-
ees are directed to pay over and deliver to him 
two-thirds of the principal of the trust fund, and 
pay the income from the remaining one-third to 
him so long as he shall live, but if my said son shall 
not have reached the age of forty-five years, but 
shall have reached the age of thirty years at the 
time of the death of my said wife, or at the time of 
my death should my said wife predecease me, then 
my Trustees are to pay over and deliver oll!e-third 
of the principal of the trust to my said son, paying 
the income from the remaining principal to him 
until he reaches the age of forty-five years when 
one-half of the remaining balance of principal of 
the trust fund shall be paid to my said son, and 
the income from the other half shall be paid to 
him so long as he shall live. Should my said son 
not have arrived at the age of thirty years at the 
time of the death of my said wife, or at the time 
of my death should his mother predecease me, then 
do I direct my Trustees to pay over and deliver 
one-third of the principal of the trust to my said 
son when he reaches the age of thirty years, and 
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one-half of the balance of the principal when my 
said son reaches the age of forty-five years. 
I authorize and empower my said trustees, in 
their discretion, to anticipate payment of the prin-
cipal amounts which my said son, pursuant to the 
terms of this my Will, is entitled to receive at the 
respective ages of thirty and forty-five years, and 
such anticipated payments, in the sole discretion of 
my Trustees, are to be made at one time, or from 
time to time, but never to exceed one-third of the 
principal before, nor one-half of the balance after, 
my son reaches the age of thirty years. 
Upon the death of my said son Frederick Fox 
Auerbach, or in case my said son shall prede-
cease my wife, then upon the death of my said 
wife, the trust hereby created shall cease and 
terminate, and tlie principal thereof shall be paid 
over and delivered to the then living issue of my 
said son, the same to be theirs, share and share 
alike, per stirpes and not per capita. Should my 
said son die without leaving issue, then upon his 
death, or upon the death of my said wife should my 
son predecease her, do I direct my said Trustees to 
pay over and deliver the principal of the trust to 
my living sisters, the same to be theirs share and 
share alike." 
"SIXTH: I hereby nominate and appoint my 
beloved wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach, to be the 
Executrix of this my Last Will and Testament, and 
the Trustee of any trust that may arise hereunder, '. 
and as Guardian of our said son, to serve without 
bond or undertaking of any name or nature. In 
case she shall predecease me, or refuse or be un-
able to serve, then I nominate and appoint Bea-
trice Fox Auerbach, of Hartford, Connecticut, as 
Executrix and as Trustee aforesaid, and as Guard-
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ian of F::ederick Fox Auerbach, without bond or 
undertaking of any name or nature, to serve for 
reasonable compensation. 
In case my said son Frederick Fox Auerbach 
shall, at the time of my death, be of the age of 
twenty-one years, I nominate and appoint him as 
co-Executor of this my Last Will and Testament 
and co-Trustee of any trust herein created, and 
direct that he qualify as such without the necessity 
of furnishing any bond. 
In case my said son shall not be of the age of 
twenty-one years, at the time of my death, then 
do I direct that when my said son reaches the 
age of twenty-one years he qualify as co-Trustee 
of any trust herein created, and I direct that he 
qualify as such without ~he necessity of furnishing 
any bond. 
I invest my Executrix or Executors and also any 
Trustee herein provided for ·with all of the rights, 
authority and powers of control and management 
over my estate and the items thereof, including the 
power to invest and reinvest the funds thereof, to 
sell and otherwise dispose of, transfer and in every 
way deal in and with, and handle the estate and its 
assets to the same extent and with like force and 
effect as I myself would have if living and without 
the interposition of any court or tribunal whatso-
ever. 
In addition to the foregoing general powers, I 
specifically authorize and empower my Executrix, 
Executors, Trustee or Trustees to sell, mortgage, 
lease and/or convey the whole, or any part, of 
any property of which I may die seized, or which 
may come into her or their possession as such, 
without the necessity of obtaining any order, or 
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orders, therefor from the Probate Court for the 
District in which this Will is probated. 
I expressly authorize and empower my said Exe-
cutrix, Executors, Trustee or Trustees, in her or 
their discretion, to execute leases on the whole, or 
on any portion, of any property which constitutes 
my estate, or the estate of any trust herein created, 
for such period of time as such Executrix, Execu-
tor, Trustee or Trustees may deem for the best 
interests of my estate or any trust herein created. 
Whenever any part of my estate, or trust estate 
created herein, is to be paid over to any benefi-
ciary, my said Executrix, Executors, Trustee or 
Trustees may, in their discretion, in lieu of money, 
pay over and transfer to the person, or persons, 
entitled to receive the same, such securities, or 
such real or personal property, or interest therein, 
as my said Executrix, Executors, Trustee or Trust-
ees shall deem to be a fair equivalent for the 
amount which is to be paid over, the judgment of 
my Executrix, Executors, Trustee or Trustees, with 
respect to such valuation and apportionment to be 
conclusive. 
I authorize and empower my said Trustees or 
Trustee, to delegate the power herein given to 
them, or to her, to any Bank,. having power to act 
as Trustee and organized under the National Bank-
ing Act, or under the laws of the States of Utah 
or Connecticut, and located either in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, or Hartford, Conn. 
I authorize and empower my said Trustee, or 
Trustees, without the necessity of delegating any 
powers, to engage the services, for such period of 
time, and under such ter~s as. she, or they, may see 
fit, of any such Bank as IS designated above, to act 
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as agent, or to discharge any of the duties which 
may be required in the administration of my es-
tate, or any trust herein created. 
I hereby authorize and empower my said Trus-
tee, or Trustees, to add to their number, and in 
the event of any vacancy, either by death or resig-
nation, to fill the same, recording the designation 
of such succeeding Trustee in any Probate Court 
in which this my Will is probated, and such suc-
ceeding Trustee shall qu~J,ify without! the necessity 
of furnishing any bond. 
Wherever I have used the word "Trustees" in 
this my Will, the powers given to them shall apply 
not alone to those Trustees herein named, but also 
to the survivors, or survivor, of them, and to any 
succeeding Trustee.'' 
The judgment' of the Court below entered on October 
31, 1958, was as follows: 
"IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DE-
CREED: 
1. By paragraph Fourth of his last Will and 
Testament, dated February 15, 1936, Frederick 
S. Auerbach, deceased, gave, devised and be-
queathed certain property to his Trustees in 
trust for specified purposes. 
2. Defendant Fannie F. A. Samuels is the pres-
ent life beneficiary of the trust estate and as such 
has the right to receive the income from the trust 
during the term of her natural life. 
3. The Will of FrederickS. Auerbach does not 
limit the right of Fannie F. A. Samuels to release, 
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assign, sell or otherwise dispose of her interest in 
the trust and she may dispose of such interest as 
she sees fit. 
4. Upon the effective termination, in any way, 
of the interest owned by the present life beneficiary 
the interests of the other beneficiaries in the trust 
will be accelerated, and the Trustees will have the 
duties and discretions to make payments or dis-
tributions of income and principal to such persons 
and in such amounts as they would or could have 
paid or distributed had the present life benefi-
ciary died at the moment of termination of such 
interest in the trust. 
5. The interest owned by the present life bene-
ficiary may be effectively terminated by the bene-
ficiary releasing the Trustees from their obligations 
to the said beneficiary under the trust; provided, 
however, that this shall not be construed as a 
declaration that release is the only effective means 
of termination of the life estate during the lifetime 
of the owner of the present life interest. 
6. Upon the death of Fannie F. A. Samuels 
and Frederick Fox Auerbach, or upon the death 
of Frederick Fox Auerbach if the life estate now 
held by Fannie F. A. Samuels has been effectively 
terminated prior to his death, the trust is to be 
terminated and the trust property distributed to 
the issue of Frederick Fox Auerbach living at the 
time of his death, but in default of issue to others. 
7. The term "issue" as used in the above para-
graph and in the 'Yill provision on which it is 
based refers to natural descendants and does not 
include children adopted bv Frederick Fox Auer-
bach or his natural descendants. 
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8. The other relief asked for by the parties is 
denied. 
9. Each of the parties is to bear his own costs." 
POINT I 
THERE CAN BE NO PARTIAL TERMINATION 
OF THE FREDERICKS. AUERBACH TRUST AND 
INVASION OF PRINCIPAL BY THE SON DURING 
THE LIFETIME OF HIS MOTHER CONTRARY 
TO THE INTENTION AND EXPRESS TERMS OF 
THE TRUST INSTRUMENT AND WITH MATER-
IAL OBJECTS AND PURPOSES OF THE TESTA- · 
TOR REMAINING TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, THE 
TRUST MUST CONTINUE FOR THE PERIOD OF 
TIME PRESCRIBED IN THE TRUST INSTRU-
MENT EVEN IF THE INTERESTS OF NON-CON-
SENTING C 0 NT I N G E N T BENEFICIARIES 
WOULD NOT BE PREJUDICED BY THE PREMA-
TURE TERMINATION OF THE TRUST. 
The Court below in construing the will of Frederick S. 
Auerbach held that in the event decedent's widow re-
linquished her life interest in the income from the trust 
established under the will, the trust would thereupon be 
automatically terminated in part to the same effect as if 
the widow had died. Under this construction of the trust 
instrument, the trustees would immediately upon relin-
quishment of the widow's life interest, be under the man-
datory duty of paying one-third of the trust principal to 
the son, he now having reached the age of 30. The trus-
tees would also then immediately have the discretion to 
pay an additional one-third of the principal to the son 
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and be under the mandatory duty to do so when he 
reaches the age of 45. 
The construction placed upon the will by the Court 
below was erroneous for the simple reason that the will 
specifically provides and shows the clear intention of the 
testator that there can be no invasion of principal by the 
son and no termination of the trust in whole or in part 
during the lifetime of the Mother whether or not she 
relinquishes her life interest in the income from the trust 
prior to her death. The effect of the Court's interpretation 
is to re-write the testator's will and permit the widow by 
her sole action or by agreement with her son, to extinguish 
and destroy the rights of plaintiffs and appellants, as 
sisters of the deceased and contingent beneficiaries under 
the will, in and to two-thirds of the trust estate. The 
effect also is to similarly extinguish and destroy the rights 
of any unborn issue of the son who if born and the son 
predeceased the widow, would be entitled to take the 
trust estate on the widow's death instead of plaintiffs. 
The effect, in short, is to defeat and frustrate the inten-
tions of the testator, prevent the purposes for which the 
trust was created from being accomplished and permit 
the partial destruction of a trust prior to the expiration 
of the specific period prescribed for its duration by the 
testator. 
Under applicable authorities, the question in this case 
whether the trust will terminate, in part, by the relinquish-
ment of the widow's life interest in the income from the 
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trust in exactly the same way it would have terminated if 
she died, is strictly and solely a question of the testator's 
intention. This intention is the governing and deciding 
factor. 
As shown hereafter, we take the law to be absolutely 
settled and clear that a testamentary trust imposing active 
duties upon the trustees and created to accomplish cer-
tain objects and purposes of the testator and to exist for 
a specified term of years or until the happening of certain 
specified events cannot be terminated by the agreement 
of the beneficiaries even if all the beneficiaries agree and 
consent to such termination. It is equally well settled 
and clear that a trust created for a specified period of 
time cannot be terminated in any event where the interests 
of non-consenting beneficiaries would be prejudiced by 
the proposed termination. 
Under the facts of the present case, the intention of 
FrederickS. Auerbach is manifest on the face of the testa-
mentary instrument whereby he created a trust for the 
benefit of his wife, his son, his son's issue, and his sisters. 
The will was carefully drawn and discloses a carefully 
thought out and well considered plan of testamentary 
disposition. The language is plain that the trust corpus 
was to remain intact and no invasion thereof permitted 
by any one or for any purpose during the lifetime of his 
wife, Fannie. The trust estate was to stay in one piece, 
no matter what, until his wife's death. This intent is 
made doubly plain when the trust instrument is con-
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sidered in the light of the testator's family situation and 
the nature of the decedent's assets which were placed in 
trust under the terms of his will. 
Frederick S. Auerbach at the time of his death was 
only 48 years of age and a relatively young man. His will 
had been executed only two years previously in Hartford, 
Connecticut. It was witnessed by his wife's family coun-
sel, Solomon Elsner, and shows evidence of careful pro-
fessional assistance in its preparation and draftsmanship. 
The testator's immediate family consisted of his wife, 
Fannie, and one child, a boy, Frederick Fox Auerbach. 
This son was of tender years, being only 11 at the time of 
his father's death. 
The chief properties owned by decedent at the time 
of his death consisted of a one-third interest in the stock 
of the Auerbach Company, which owns and operates a 
department store in Salt Lake City~ and Auerbach Realty 
Company, which owns valuable tracts of real estate and 
improvements thereon in Salt Lake City. The Auerbach 
Company was and always had been a closely held family 
enterprise, as well as in the case of the realty company. 
Following the death of decedent's father many years ago 
the stock of the company and management of the store 
camr under the control and ownership of the three Auer-
bach brothers, George. Frederick and Herbert, residing 
in Salt Lake Cit,·. Their sisters. Bessie, Madeline. Selma 
(plaintiffs herein), Josephine and Jennie, resided in New 
York. .Josephine died man~· years ago and Jennie died 
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on February 28, 1949. 
The deceased, Frederick, and his brother, George, mar-
ried the sisters Fannie and Beati·ice Fox of Hartford, 
Connecticut. The Fox family for many years has owned 
large property interests in the latter city, including a 
nationally known department store. George pre-deceased 
Frederick by several years and George's wife, Beatrice, 
with her children, has since her husband's death per-
manently resided in Hartford. On his death, George's 
one-third interest in the Auerbach store came under the 
control of Beatrice. George and Beatrice had no sons, 
all of their children being daughters. Following George's 
death, the Auerbach store was managed and controlled 
by the two surviving brothers, Frederick and Herbert. 
Herbert never married and had no children. Decedent's 
son, Frederick Fox Auerbach, was the only son to be 
born to any of the three Auerbach brothers. It was only 
natural that the Father of this boy should go to great 
pains in his will to make it possible for the boy, as the 
third generation, to one day succeed him and take over 
the management of the store. This day, of course, would 
be some time away because at the time of the execution 
of his Father's will, the son was only 9 years old. Herbert, 
however, could be relied on to undoubtedly assist the 
boy in getting established in the business and carry on 
the long family tradition of Auerbach control and owner-
ship of the store. 
The deceased and his brother, Herbert, were very close. 
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They likewise enjoyed a very close family relationship 
with their sisters in New York. Although George and 
Frederick had married into the Fox family, one thing 
is for sure, namely, neither Frederick nor Herbert ever 
had any intention of permitting the ownership, manage-
ment and control of the Auerbach store to be turned over 
to the Fox family. Reciprocal option provisions (never 
exercised) in both Frederick's and Herbert's wills to buy 
each other's stock, together with the other provisions of 
the will, show clearly the intent of Frederick to prevent 
his one-third interest from following that of Beatrice back 
to Hartford. 
Along with his concern for keeping the Auerbach store 
in the Auerbach family and protecting the future inter-
ests of his son, his brother, and his sisters, the deceased, 
of course, had a real concern for making suitable and 
harmonious provision for his wife, Fannie. The recon-
cilation of these various interests and objectives needed 
a carefully drawn testamentary instrument and permit-
ting it to be drafted by the Fox family attorney, Solomon 
Elsner, would undoubtedly assure Fannie that her 
interests were being adequately looked after. Ac-
complishment of his long range objectives without the 
active opposition of his wife or Beatrice or other members 
of the Fox fan1ily, to which he "·as now related by mar-
riage, \\·as obviously to be desired by the testator. 
Before turning to what the decedent did in his will, 
it perhaps is of some significance to point out "·hat he 
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did not do. He did not, after making provision for cer-
tain specific legacies, leave all of the remainder and 
residue of his property, including the Auerbach stock, 
to his wife outright. He left it in trust to trustees with 
active and broad specified powers and subject to certain 
restrictions and conditions. In creating the trust, he did 
not create a spend-thrift trust, nor did he give the trus-
tees discretionary authority to invade principal in case 
of need of the beneficiaries. He did not condition his 
wife's right to life income from the trust upon her not 
remarrying. He did not allocate a portion of the income 
to the wife and a part to the boy. He left all the income 
of the trust, no more and no less, to the wife for life 
knowing that out of this income she would make adequate 
provision for her son as circumstances might require and 
until, as he hoped, the boy might succeed the Father in 
the family business and have ample income of his own. 
The appointment of and provisions concerning the 
trustees of the trust shows evidence of particularly careful 
planning. The plan adopted could hardly have been im-
proved upon to accomplish his long-range objectives. He 
set up a plan for the appointment of multiple trustees, 
his wife one, his boy another when he reached 21, and 
with authority for the appointment of others to handle 
the actual work of administering the trust and to share 
the responsibilities of voting control of the Auerbach stock 
interests in the trust. Specific permission was given to dele-
gate the powers of the trustees to a bank either in Hart-
ford or Salt Lake City. He realized, of course, that his 
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wife and boy were devoid of any business experience. 
Fannie, however, could be expected to be largely depend-
ent upon and influenced by Herbert during the latter's 
lifetime. In any event the option provision covering the 
Auerbach stock would almost compel such cooperation. 
He knew that Herbert would, of course, leave his one-
third interest in the stock to his sisters in New York. 
Frederick realized that in the long run his estate's one-
third interest in the store would stand directly between 
the one-third interest in the Beatrice Fox family and the 
one-third interest of Herbert in the Auerbach family. 
The long range interests of the decedent's son would 
best be accomplished by a long-term trust with voting 
power of the Auerbach stock in the trust diluted and 
shared throughout the lifetime of his wife between the 
wife, the son and the other trustees to be appointed under 
the will. Under such a plan neither Beatrice and her 
successors nor Herbert and his successors would gain the 
upper hand to the possible future prejudice of the boy. 
Fannie, during her lifetime, as the boy's l\lother could, 
of course, be expected to have an interest in protecting 
and advancing her boy's interest. On the other hand, if 
in the future for some reason she did not adequately look 
after such interests, the boy upon becoming of age would 
share and han? some say himself in the \·oting of the 
Auerbach stork in the trust. Neither Fannie nor the boy 
"·ithout the consent of each other or of the other trustees, 
could thus during Fannie's lifetime do anything to prej-
udice the interests of the other. In fact, under this type 
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of arrangement the boy's long range interests and possi-
bilities of succeeding to the management of the store 
could be expected to receive the sanction of both Auer-
bach and Fox sides of the family. In the event decedent's 
wife refused or was unable to serve as trustee, specific pro-
vision in the will for the appointment of Beatrice to serve 
in her place could be expected to accomplish the same 
long range objective. 
Under these somewhat complicated and unique family 
circumstances, accomplishment of the testator's objectives 
required the creation of a long-term trust in which the 
corpus of the trust and voting control of the Auerbach 
stock would be kept absolutely intact throughout his wife's 
life. Not until she died could the trustees distribute the 
two one-third portions of the trust principal to the boy. 
The need of his wife for life income, as a member of the 
quite solvent Fox family, was clearly a secondary and 
minor consideration. The income she could take or leave 
alone. A renunciation of his wife's interest in the income 
would merely permit the boy as the next succeeding life 
tenant under the trust to draw down the income. Under 
no circumstances, however, was the management of the 
trust principal and the control of the Auerbach stock to 
leave the trustees until the actual death of his wife. 
Throughout his wife's life (whether or not she drew in-
come), he wanted the stock kept intact and under the 
joint control of the boy and his Mother and their co-
trustees. Not until his wife's death did he wish any part 
of the stock to leave the friendly protection of the trust 
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and run the risk of being squandered or disposed of by 
the boy. After his wife died, he was agreeable to the part-
ial distribution to his son of up to two-thirds of the Auer-
bach stock i£ at that time the trustees saw fit to give it to 
him or if he had reached the ages of 30 or 45. The boy's 
possible future issue would in any event be partially pro-
tected against the improvidence of their Father by re-
ceiving at least one-third of the trust estate on final 
termination of the trust at the death of their Father. If 
the boy were to die before his Mother, leaving issue, it was 
of importance to decedent that all of the stock stay in 
the family and go to these issue and if there were no issue, 
stay in the family and go to his living sisters. The stock 
of necessity would therefore have to stay intact in the 
trust until the actual date of his wife's death. Further-
more, if the boy without issue predeceased his Mother and 
Fannie outlived and survived decedent's sisters, the estate 
would then pass by intestacy to decedent's heirs, that is, 
the children of his sisters, Josephine and Selma, and his 
brother, George, and still stay in the Auerbach family on 
a non-preferential basis. All of these contingent beneficial 
family rights in his son's unborn issue, in his sisters and 
in his heirs would, of course, be cut off and destroyed if 
prior to the death of Fannie the trust were permitted to 
be prematurely terminated. 
Although the testator ga,·e his wife a life income from 
the trust, if she wanted it, and a life tenure as co-trustee, 
the last thing in the world he intended was to give his 
wife the sole and exclusive power and discretion in her 
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lifetime to terminate the trust in whole or in part merely 
by declining to draw down the trust income. Her re-
nunciation or release of income has no connection what-
soever with the testator's specific and express intent of 
keeping the trust estate completely intact and beyond the 
possibility of waste and impairment until the death of his 
wife. 
The status of Fannie as co-trustee and her right to a life 
income from the trust must be carefully separated and not 
confused. The income she rna y take or by disclaimer 
permit her boy to now receive. She cannot, however, in 
her capacity as trustee, either alone or in concert with 
her co-trustees, partially terminate the trust to the extent 
of two-thirds of the principal prior to the time prescribed 
therefor by the testator. The time so prescribed is the time 
of her death and not before and even then only on certain 
events. Fannie could, of course, theoretically renounce her 
duties as co-trustee by resignation (which she has never 
proposed to do), but such resignation would again not 
have the slightest bearing on the testator's strong intention 
to keep the Auerbach stock intact in the trust throughout 
his wife's lifetime and under the joint or group control 
of multiple trustees. Again, one thing is for sure, this 
trust will never fail for want of trustees. The testator 
wished until the date of his wife's death, part control of 
the stock vested in his boy, part control in his wife or in 
the event of her refusal to serve, in Beatrice, and part 
control in others. He had good reasons for doing this. 
His intention and the accomplishment of his objectives 
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must be respected. 
Let us turn now to the language of the will and see how 
precisely and clearly the testator's intention and testa-
mentary plan is spelled out in that instrument. 
In the first subparagraph of paragraph Fourth of the 
will, decedent left the residue of his estate to his trustees 
in trust "the income therefrom to be paid to my beloved 
wife, Fannie Fox Auerbach, for and during the term of 
her natural life, and upon her death, or in case my said 
wife shall die before I die, to my son, Frederick Fox 
Auerbach, for and during the term of his natural life ... " 
In the last subparagraph, the testator goes on to provide 
that "Upon the death of my said son Frederick Fox Auer-
bach, or in case my said son shall predecease my wife, then 
upon the death of my said wife, the trust hereby created 
shall cease and terminate, ... " The testator then provides 
on such termination for payment of the principal per 
stirpes to his son's living issue and, if there be no issue, 
to his living sisters share and share alike. 
The above provisions are referred to as showing beyond 
any question the basic intent of the testator to create a 
long-term trust which, according to his direction, must 
continue throughout the lifetimes of both his "ife and his 
son and with the trust principal to be kept intact beyond 
the possibility of impairment during this period. Not until 
thr death of the survi,·or of his wife and boy is the trust 
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to finally and completely terminate. 
Spaced in between the above provisions which are at 
the beginning and end of paragraph Fourth and which 
provide for the creation, continuance and final termina-
tion of the trust for the specified period, are provisions by 
way exception which authorize, subject to certain events 
and conditions, a partial termination of the trust and dis-
tribution of up to two-thirds of the trust principal to the 
son. It is of special significance that these intermediate 
provisions relating to a partial invasion of trust principal 
by the son are by way of exception and only authorize a 
distribution of carefully measured amounts under certain 
specified conditions. We say the provisions are by way 
of exception because the will itself says " ... excepting 
that if my said son Frederick Fox Auerbach, at the time 
of the death of my said wife ... " shall have reached 45 
he shall receive two-thirds of the principal but if he is 30 
and not yet 45 " ... at the time of the death of my said 
wife ... ", he shall receive one-third of the principal and 
another one-third when he does reach 45. The above pro-
visions deal with the situation where "at the time of the 
death of" his wife, the boy has reached 45 or at least 30 
years of age. The following sentence goes on to provide 
that if the boy is not 30 " ... at the time of thte death of 
my said wife .. . ",he is to receive one-third when he does 
reach 30 and another one-third when he reaches 45. 
We invite the Court's attention to the difference in 
language between the boy's right to succeed his Mother to 
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the income of the trust " ... upon her death ... ", and 
his right to invade principal only if " ... at the time of the 
death of my said wife, ... " he shall have reached the 
specified ages. The right to invade is thus specifically 
conditional upon the happening of two events in time, 
namely, the actual date or time of death of decedent's 
wife and the attainment of the specified ages by the boy. 
The second subparagraph of paragraph Fourth goes 
on to provide that the trustees are authorized" ... in their 
discretion, to anticipate payment of the principal amounts 
which my said son, pursuant to the terms of this my Will_, 
is entitled to receive at the respective ages of thirty and 
forty-five years ... " except that not more than one-third 
can be paid before he is 30, nor more than another one-
third after 30. This subparagraph quite clearly only per-
mits the trustees to ignore, in their discretion, in part the 
age restrictions on the boy in making payment of princi-
pal. It gives them no authority to ignore the additional and 
separate condition that no principal can be paid to the 
boy until the actual date or time of death of his Mother. 
Anticipation is permitted only of amounts which the boy 
"pursuant to the terms of this my Will" is entitled to re-
ceive. Under the preceding terms of the will, in the first 
subparagraph, no payments of principal are permitted 
until the time of the Mother's death. In other words, the 
trustees are given partial discretion to wah ·e the age re-
striction of the boy but not the death restriction of the 
Mother. Authority to waive one condition is not author-
ity for the waiver of a second. 
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Paragraph Sixth of the will deals with the appointment 
and powers of the executrix and trustees under the will. 
It is unnecessary to repeat here the broad, detailed and 
extensive powers conferred upon the trustees by decedent. 
Suffice it to say that this paragraph provides for and 
contemplated the appointment of a group of trustees with 
no limitation as to number, composed of decedent's wife 
or, in the event of her prior death or refusal or inability to 
serve, Beatrice Fox Auerbach, the son when he became 
21, and others. Specific authority was given for the dele-
gation of powers to a bank in either Hartford or Salt Lake 
City or to engage the services of any such bank in ad-
ministering the trust estate. The appointment of any 
trustee was to be recorded in the Probate Court in which 
the will was probated. The trustees are given all powers 
of control and management over the trust estate which 
decedent would himself have had, if living, including 
power to invest, reinvest, sell, dispose of , mortgage, lease, 
convey, etc. The will is silent on the point as to whether 
specific action by the trustees may be taken without un-
animous consent. All trustees are to serve without bond. 
The provisions evince a clear intent that no temporary, 
short-term arrangement was being contemplated but one 
of long-term duration and where" ... in the event of any 
vacancy, either by death or resignation. . ." among the 
trustees, other and succeeding trustees were and are to be 
appointed to carry out and accomplish the desires and 
objectives of the testator. 
We turn now to the citation of various authorities which 
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demonstrate conclusively that a testator in creating a 
testamentary trust may keep the trust principal intact 
throughout the lifetime of his wife or other prescribed 
period and in the accomplishment of his objectives and 
purposes, prevent the termination of the trust either in 
whole or in part until those objectives and purposes have 
been accomplished. 
A case very closely parallel to the family situation here 
involved is Re Hamburger~ ( 1924) 185 Wis. 270, 201 
N.W. 267, 37 A.L.R. 1413. Nathan Hamburger, Sr., had 
been admitted as a partner, in 1883, to the firm of Gimbel 
Brothers having originally, as a boy of 13, entered the 
employ of Adam Gimbel, founder of the business. In 
1910, at the time of his death, Hamburger was vice-pres-
ident of Gimbel Brothers, Incorporated, and in charge 
of the Milwaukee store. His immediate family consisted 
of his wife and one son, Nathan, Jr., who at the time of 
his Father's death was about 13 years of age. Five sons 
and nine grandsons of Adam Gimbel and the son of 
deceased, Nathan Hamburger, Jr. (from 1923 when he 
became 21), were all connected "·ith the business. 
By his will dated a short time before his death Nathan 
Hamburger, Sr., after certain specific bequests to relatives 
and charities, left all of the residue and remainder of his 
estate to trustees to hold and in,·est the same and pay the 
net incon1e thereof to his beloved "·ife, Bertha Ham-
burger, so long as she 1nay live and with power to dispose 
of it by wi1L or otherwise, and if not so disposed of to be-
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come part of her intestate estate. Bertha (who subse-
quently remarried) was appointed and became one of 
four trustees. Among the assets of the trust were 23,000 
shares of Gimbel Brothers, Incorporated. The wife, as 
trustee, wished to transfer 1,000 of these shares to her son, 
Nathan, Jr., who now holding an executive position in the 
Philadelphia store desired to have a substantial interest 
in the business. Two of the trustees approved of the action 
but the trustee bank declined on the ground of lack of 
authority. In an action brought by the son to construe the 
will, the lower court ruled that the trustees were auth-
orized to make the assignment of the shares in the store 
from the trust to the son. On appeal this judgment was 
reversed. The Court stated: 
"He (the testator) had accumulated by his per-
sonal effort a very considerable fortune. It seems 
clea11 to us that in disposing of it by will, his para-
mount object was to make certain that during her 
life his widow should have every comfort suitable 
to her rank in life. Next to this purpose was the 
desire to make suitable provision for his only son, 
Nathan, then a small boy. He had doubtless ob-
served enough of the vicissitudes of life to realize 
that it often happens that fortunes accumulated by 
the industry and economy of a lifetime, may be 
lost, in the hands of persons inexperienced in busi-
ness affairs, in a twelvemonth. He therefore made 
very careful and elaborate provision for such care 
and preservation of his estate during the life of 
his widow as to guard against such possibilities. 
The widow was not appointed to act as trustee 
alone, but two other trustees in whom he had con-
fidence were named." 
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A leading case is Claflin v. Claflin (1889) 149 Mass. 
19, 3 L.R.A. 370, 20 N.E. 454, where the testator left the 
residue of his estate to trustees "to sell and dispose of the 
same and to pay to my wife, Mary A. Claflin, one third 
part of the proceeds thereof, and to pay to my son Clar-
ence A. Claflin one third part of the proceeds thereof, and 
to pay the remaining one third part thereof to my son 
Adelbert E. Claflin in the manner following, viz.: $10,000 
when he is of the age of twenty-one years; $10,000 when 
he is of the age of twenty-five years; and the balance when 
he is of the age of thirty years." The Court sustained the 
provisions of the will and refused to permit the son upon 
reaching his majority to take the remaining installments 
prior to his attainment of the ages specified in the will. 
The Court stated: 
"In the case at bar nothing has happened which 
the testator did not anticipate, and for which he 
has not made provision. It is plainly his will that 
neither the income nor any part of the principal 
should now be paid to the plaintiff. It is true that 
the plaintiff's interest is alienable' by him, and can 
be taken by his creditors to pay his debts; but it 
does not follow because the testator has not im-
posed all possi.ble restrictions that the rest_ric~ons 
which he has 1mposed should not be earned mto 
effect." 
As summarized in 123 A.L.R. 1427: 
"It may be stated a~ the ~utset that. subject to 
considerations of pubhc pohcy, the nght of an 
owner of property to project his wishes into the 
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future to regulate the disposition of his property 
is recognized in law, and any rule purporting to 
deal with the right of the beneficiaries to terminate 
a trust by mutual consent before the expiration of 
the limitation prescribed for the trust by its creator 
must, of necessity, be subordinate to the expressed 
or implied purposes of the settlor in creating the 
trust, and to his express or implied direction not to 
terminate the trust within its fixed duration. If 
those purposes are not executed but remain execu-
tory, and if they require the continuance of the 
trust so that the wishes and desires of the creator 
may be substantiated, by the better view the trust 
will not be terminated, although all the beneficiar-
ies, both those who have a present interest in the 
trust and those who have or may have a future 
interest, vested or contingent, mutually consent to 
the termination of the trust and the surrender of 
the trust property to the respective beneficiaries 
as their interests may appear under the trust in-
strument." 
In Mohler v. Wesner (1943) 382 Ill. 225,47 NE2d 64, 
two specific conditions were involved, that is, the attain-
ment by one beneficiary of 21 years of age and the death 
of another beneficiary. The Court held that the second 
condition not having been met, there could be no termi-
nation of the trust even though the beneficiary whose 
death was made a condition waived his rights under 
the trust and it appeared that contingent interests could 
not be determined until the death of such beneficiary. 
The Court said: 
"For reasons best known to herself, the testatrix 
saw fit to provide an income for her nephew and 
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to designate as the ultimate beneficiaries of her 
estate her nephew's children, or in the event any 
one or more of his children predeceased him, then 
their heirs-at-law at the time of the termination 
of the trust. The validity of this provision is not 
assailed, and it is the duty of the courts to render 
it effective and to not frustrate the clearly ex-
pressed intention of the testatrix. The purposes 
of the trust have not been substantially satisfied; 
there are contingent interests in the trust fund, 
and a present determination of the ultimate bene-
ficiaries would be sheer speculation." 
Remembering that the will of Frederick S. Auerbach 
was executed in Hartford, Connecticut, we invite the 
Court's particular attention to the leading case of Hills vs. 
Travelers Bank & Trust Company (1939) 125 Conn. 640, 
7 A. 2d 652, 123 A.L.R. 1419, involving the same issue 
as the case at bar. 
In this case Charles I. Hills transferred certain property 
to a trustee in trust to pay the net income in thirds to 
Matilda King Hills and to Charles and Thomas, her sons, 
or to the immediate issue of said sons, if either or both 
shall die before she does, so long as Matilda King Hills 
shall live. It was provided that upon the death of Mrs. 
Hills, the trustee should hold the property for the joint 
benefit of Charles and Thomas until they respectively 
reached thr age of 30 years at which time the trust prop-
erty was to be transferred to them. It was also provided 
that should either of the sons die before their Mother 
or after her and before attaining the age of 30 leaYing 
immediate issue, such issue upon the death of Matilda or 
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upon the death of either subsequent to her death and be-
fore arriving at age 30, should receive the property their 
parent would have received per stirpes. In the event of 
the death of either before the age of 30, it was provided 
that the income should be paid to the survivor or his issue 
and upon the Mother's death or in the event of the death 
of either after her death and before reaching 30 without 
issue, the principal to be paid to the survivor or to his 
issue per stirpes if he died leaving issue. 
The elder Hills had died in 1915 leaving his widow 
and the two sons, plaintiffs in the action, as his sole heirs. 
It appeared at time of the suit that Charles was 38 years 
old, married and with no children except an adopted son 
aged 16. Thomas was 33 years of age and still unmarried. 
Mrs. Hills was 60 years of age. In 1938, the Mother sign-
ed an instrument purporting to relinquish all her interest 
in the trust estate. Plaintiffs filed suit to compel the 
trustee to transfer to them the trust estate and then by an 
amended complaint sought to compel disribution of two-
thirds of the property with the remainder to be continued 
in trust for the benefit of the Mother until her death and 
distributed equally to plaintiffs at the time of her death. 
The lower Court's judgment permitted the trust term-
ination and sustained the claims of plaintiffs. The J udg-
ment of the lower Court was, however, reversed upon 
appeal, the Court upholding the trustee's construction 
of the instrument that irrespective of whether the sons 
had now attained the age of 30, "only upon the death of 
Mrs. Hills is either son, or if he dies before her, his immed-
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iate issue, if any, entitled to receive his share of the trust 
property ... " Furthermore, " ... until the death of Mrs. 
Hills unborn issue of either son have a potential benefi-
cial interest in the trust." 
The Court stated: 
"Under the meaning which we ascribe to the 
terms of the trust deed the plaintiffs have, during 
the life of Mrs. Hills, only a right to one-third 
each of the income of the trust. Both having 
reached the age of thirty years, each has a vested 
third interest in the trust fund, subject to divest-
ment by his death before that of Mrs. Hills .... 
If such death occurs his rights, both to income 
during the remainder of Mrs. Hills' life and in the 
principal upon her death, would pass to his issue, 
if any, or, if he leave no issue, to the other son if 
he survives, or, if not, to his issue, and such suc-
cessor would not take by inheritance but under 
the trust instrument itself .... It follows that pos-
sible unborn issue of each plaintiff have a potential 
interest under the trust. 
"The function of the court with reference to 
trusts is not be remake the trust instrument, reduce 
or increase the size of the gifts made therein or 
accord the beneficiary more advantage than the 
donor directed that he should enjoy, but rather to 
ascertain what the donor directed that the donee 
should receive and to secure to him the enjoyment 
of that interest only .... Conditions precedent 
which should concur in order to warrant termina-
tion of a trust by judicial decree include "that all 
the parties in interest unite in seeking the termina-
tion, that every reasonable purpose of the trust's 
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creation and existence llas been accomplished, and 
that no fair and lawful restriction imposed by the 
[settlor] will be nullified or disturbed by such a 
result." ... Under the construction which we ac-
cord to the trust deed and the relevant facts of 
the present situation these conditions do not ap-
pear to be satisfied. The first of these is that all 
of the parties in interest must unite in seeking the 
termination. If some such parties are not com-
petent to act for themselves or are yet unborn, it is 
obvious that their 'interests, whether presently 
vested or contingent, should be properly represent-
ed and protected. Unborn immediate issue of 
each of the plaintiffs have a contingent interest in 
both income and principal, but they are unrepre-
sented. As the trust is not of a public or charitable 
nature the purpose of making the attorney gen-
eral a party defendant ... is not apparent, but it 
cannot be and is not now claimed that his presence 
as a party affords adequate representation for un-
born issue of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs may not 
be regarded as themselves representing them since 
their interests are not identical ... and as the con-
clusions of the trial court are not 'as favorable to 
them as they could possibly claim' ... , we cannot 
say that they could suffer no detriment from lack 
of representation. 'The court will not allow the 
cestuis with vested interests to shut out the existing 
or possible future cestuis by procuring a court de-
cree for termination and for distribution among 
the present holders of vested interests.' ... 
"Also, since we construe the trust deed as ex-
pressing an intent that the plaintiffs should notre-
ceive the principal until the death of Mrs. Hills, 
that pp.rpose has not been accomplished. ~nd 
cannot be until her decease and the restnct1on 
so imposed would be nullified by an earlier 
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termination of the trust as to them and dis-
tribution to them from the corpus of the trust 
estate . . . Termination is to be limited to 
cases where not only all the interests created 
have vested and the parties are sui juris and repre-
sented but also the design and object of the trust 
has been at least practically accomplished .... 
When, as here, the distribution under the trust 
is limited to income during a period measured by 
a specified lifetime and the present holders of a 
vested interest may through death during that peri-
od be succeeded, by substitution under the terms 
of the instrument as distinguished from by inheri-
tance, by issue yet unborn, there are 'contingent 
interests which are not now determinable but 
which must not be disregarded.' and the trust must 
continue so long as does the contingency .... 
The consequence is that it is incumbent upon the 
trustee to continue to administer the trust not only 
as to Mrs. Hills' one-third share, but also as to the 
other two-thirds 'so long as Mrs. Hills shall live' 
and upon her decease, only, will distribution of 
the principal be permissable. 
"There is error and the case is remanded to the 
Superior Court with direction to render judgment 
for the defendants." 
In Af oxley v. Title Insurance & Trust Company, 27 
Cal. 2d 457, 165 P2d 15, 163 A.L.R. 838, it appeared 
that a trust had been created for the benefit of a 16 year 
old daughter to accumulate the income subject to a dis-
cretionary power to make expenditures thereof for the 
daughter's support care, and education until she should 
attain the age of 35. when she was to receive the trust 
property and all accumulations of income, with a further 
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provision that should the daughter die before reaching 
the age of 35 the trust property should go to her child 
or children, or in default of children to her appointee, or 
in default of appointment to certain· named beneficiaries. 
the daughter, at age 26 and when married but without 
children, sought to terminate the trust. This the Court 
refused to do and stated: 
"Ordinarily, the function of the court with 
reference to active trusts is not to remake the 
trust instrument, reduce or increase the size of 
the gifts made therein or accord the beneficiary 
more advantage than the donor directed that 
he should enjoy, but rather to ascertain what the 
donor directed that the donee should receive and 
to secure to him the enjoyment of that interest." 
In Stevenson v. Stevenson) 205 Ill. App. 15 ( 1917), 
the will provided that all remaining property of testator 
be held for the benefit of the wife for life and on her 
death five named individuals (nephews and nieces) were 
to be paid certain specified amounts, "provided they are 
living at the time of the death of my wife." The Court 
held that upon the renunciation by the widow of her life 
interest, the trust did not terminate and the interest of 
the nephews and nieces was not to be accelerated. 
In re Byrnel Estate) 149 Misc. 449, 267 N.Y.S. 627 
(1933) involved a will wherein the testator gave the 
residue of his estate in trust for his widow for life or until 
her remarriage and upon her death or remarriage to 
such children of Ronald (brother of the testator) as were 
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living-at the time of the death or remarriage of the widow 
and to the issue of any deceased child of Ronald living 
at either of those events. Upon the renunciation by the 
widow of her interest in the trust by electing to take her 
statutory share, the Court held that the trust could not be 
terminated until the death of the widow and that the 
trust principal could not be presently distributed to 
Ronald's children. 
Section 337 of the Restatement of the Law of Trusts 
provides: 
"CONSENT OF BENEFICIARIES. 
( 1 ) Except as stated in Subsection ( 2), if 
all of the beneficiaries of a trust consent and 
none of them is under an incapacity, they can 
compel the termination of the trust. 
( 2 ) If the continuance of the trust is nec-
essary to carry out a material purpose of the 
trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its term-
ination." 
Again, Section 340 provides: 
"Where Some of the Beneficiaries Do Not 
Consent. 
( 1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) and 
in Sees. 335 and 336 (purposes illegal or im-
possible of accomplishment 1, if one or more of 
the beneficiaries of a trust do not consent to its 
termination or are under ari incapacity, the 
others cannot compel the termination of the 
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trust, except in accordance with the terms of the 
trust. 
( 2) Although one or more of the benefici-
aries of a trust do not consent to its termination 
or are under an incapacity, the court may decree 
a partial termination of the trust if the interests 
of the beneficiaries who do not consent or are 
under an incapacity are not prejudiced thereby 
and if the continuance of the trust is not nec-
essary to carry out a material purpose of the 
trust." 
Comment g. states: 
"When partial termination not permitted. If 
one or more of the beneficiaries of a trust do not 
consent to its termination or are not ascertained 
or are under an incapacity, the others cannot 
compel the partial termination of the trust, if 
the interest of the non-consenting beneficiaries 
may be prejudiced thereby." 
Scott on Trusts, Sec. 340.2, Vol. III, 2nd Ed., states 
as follows: 
"Partial termination. As has been stated, the 
beneficiaries of a trust if they all concur can 
compel the termination of the trust as to a part 
of the property, unless the continuance of the 
trust of all the property is necessary to carry out 
a material purpose of the trust. Where some of 
the beneficiaries do not concur, however, the 
others cannot compel a termination of the trust 
as to a part of the trust property unless the in-
terests of the nonconsenting beneficiaries are 
not prejudiced by such partial termination. 
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In a number of cases the court has refused 
to decree the partial termination of the trust 
where some of the beneficiaries did not consent. 
In some of these cases doubtless the court would 
not have permitted the partial termination of 
the trust even if all of the beneficiaries had 
consented, since this would defeat the intention 
of the settlor in creating the trust. But even if 
the partial termination of the trust would not 
defeat the intention of the settlor, the court will 
not permit such termination over the objections 
of som.e of the beneficiaries." 
In 163 A.L.R. 858 under the sub-heading "As affected 
by the contingent character of the interests involved," it 
is stated: 
" ... it is quite generally recognized that where 
some of the interests created under the trust 
depend for their vesting upon the happening of 
contingencies which have not yet occurred at 
the time of the application for the termination 
of the trust, and the interests so created remain 
contingent either because of the uncertainty of 
the event upon the occurrence of which they are 
to vest or uncertainty of the persons in whom 
they are to vest, as where some of the possible 
beneficiaries are unborn, the trust will not be 
terminated although its termination is consented 
to by all the existing beneficiaries who have a 
vested interest therein, present or future, because 
in such case the condition that consent of all the 
beneficiaries must be procured to terminate the 
trust cannot be complied with before the hap-
pening of the. contingencv and. the _vesting of 
the interest, since those who Will ultimately be 
entitled to the corpus of the estate cannot be 
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predetermined. Walter v. Commisioner of Inter-
nal Revenue (1942: CCA 3d) 127 F 2d 101; 
... Botzum v. Havana Nat. Bank ( 1937) 367 
Ill. 539, 12 NE 2d 203; ... Bowers' Estate 
(1943) 346 Pa. 85, 29 A2d 519; Richenbach's 
Estate ( 1943) 348 Pa. 121, 34 A2d 527; Kamer-
ly's Estate ( 1944) 348 Pa. 225, 35 A2d 258." 
Further citation of authority would unnecessarily pro-
long the brief but the Court's attention is invited to the 
cases collected in the following annotations: 
169 A.L.R. 459 
165 A.L.R. 550 
163 A.L.R. 852 
123 A.L.R. 1427 
45 A.L.R. 743 
37 A.L.R. 1420 
2 A.L.R. 579 
Under the facts of the present case and the applicable 
authorities, it is respectfully submitted that the judgment 
of the Court below is in error and should be reversed 
insofar as it permits the partial termination of the Fred-
erick S. Auerbach trust prior to the time prescribed there-
for by the testator in his will merely by reason of the 
relinquishment by the widow of her life interest in the 
income from the trust. The trust is an active trust whose 
purposes are not yet from any point of view accomplished. 
It is not for Fannie, or her new husband, or decedent's son, 
or Walker Bank & Trust Company, or the Court, to 
rewrite the will of Frederick S. Auerbach. By language 
as plain as day, he gave his son no right whatsoever to 
get at any of the trust principal, including the Auerbach 
stock, until the time of his Mother's death. The unborn 
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issue of the son, the plaintiffs as sisters of the deceased 
and the heirs of the deceased all have contingent rights in 
this trust which cannot be taken from them without their 
consent. The four new trusts substituting the children or 
grandchildren of Beatrice as contingent beneficiaries in 
decedent's assets, in lieu of plaintiffs, was not the intention 
of Frederick S. Auerbach. If this had been his desire, he 
would have said so in his will. 
The deceased had his reasons for continuing the trust 
on a long-term basis throughout the lifetime of his wife 
and the lifetime of his son and only permitting a partial 
termination of the trust and partial invasion of trust 
principal by the son at the time of the death of his wife. 
Whether these reasons be good or bad is not here material. 
Decedent's purposes, as heretofore shown, included, 
among others, an intention to put his assets during his 
wife's lifetime beyond the danger of impairment and the 
hazard of waste, to put the voting rights of his Auerbach 
stock under the joint control of a group of trustees, to 
deprive both his wife and his son of the exclusive right 
to vote and control the Auerbach stock, to deprive his 
wife and his son of the actual management and admin-
istration of the trust assets and have this work performed 
by a bank, to keep the stock under friendly trustee pro-
tection on a basis calculated in the long run to help and 
further the interests of his only son in the Auerbach 
Company, and, finally, to keep the Auerbach Company 
in the Auerbach family where it had always been since 
it was originally founded by the Auerbach family. 
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POINT II,· 
THE PRESENT ACTION BEING BROUGHT TO 
PROTECT AND CONSERVE THE TRUST ESTATE 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTENTION OF 
THE TESTATOR, PLAINTIFFS· ARE ENTITLED 
TO AN ALLOWANCE FOR COSTS AND ATTOR-
NEYS' FEES. 
The purpose of the present action is to prevent the 
illegal invasion of trust principal and dissipation of the 
trust estate by the testamentary trustees appointed under 
the will of Frederick S. Auerbach, deceased. The effect 
of the proceeding will be to, conserve and protect the 
trust assets in accordance with the intention of the test-
ator. 
The compensation of attorneys retained by a legatee, 
distributee or person beneficially interested in the ·estate 
is held to be a proper charge against the estate where the 
services of such attorneys, as in the present case, are of 
value to the entire estate and have the effect of inuring 
to the benefit of the estate as a whole. The determination 
of a reasonable attorneys' fee lies within the discretion of 
the Court depending upon the facts and circumstances of 
the particular case. A construction of the will as sought 
for by plaintiffs will quite clearly be of benefit not solely 
to plaintiffs as contingent beneficiaries but in protecting 
the interest of all of the persons beneficially interested 
in the trust estate, including decedent's widow and son, 
the son's unborn issue and plaintiffs, and the heirs of the 
deceased. The construction of the will asked for rna y 
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never be of benefit to plaintiffs. They may predecease 
the widow. The son may survive his mother. The son 
may predecease his Mother but leave issue surviving the 
Mother. The widow may survive both plaintiffs and the 
son without issue, in which event an intestacy would be 
involved. Plaintiffs are only asking that the trust be ad-
ministered strictly in accordance with the intention of 
the testator. 
In these circumstances, it was error for the Court below 
to deny plaintiffs' request for the allowance of reasonable 
attorneys' fees as a charge against the estate. 
See: Becht v. Miller: Mich., 273 N.W. 294; Matter of 
Cannariato, N.Y., 287 N.Y.S. 1010; In re Gratton's Es-
tate, Ore., 298 P. 231; In re Mundt Estates, Wash., 14 
P2d 59; Steger v. Gibson, Okla., 287 P2d 687; Temlan 
v. Reeve, Ill., 65 N.E. 2d 815. 
Respectfully submitted, 
C. M. GILMOUR, 
Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
REICHMAN. \'ERNON & 
BENNETT. 
Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
OTTERBOURG, STEINDLER, 
HOUSTON & ROSEN, 
200 Fifth Avenue, 
New York, New York 
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